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Considering the history of macroeconomics it is surprising that Tinbergen's theory of policy is 
identified with so-called Keynesian economics by Lucas and Lucasians. Keynesian 
macropolicy is accused of neglecting the role of expectations and the effects of any changes 
of institutions. Due to textual evidence this paper explains that both the disregard of 
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1. Introduction 
  This paper deals with the brief history of the Lucas critique. The Lucas critique was 
more successful in macroeconomic theory than in macroeconomic econometrics.2 Sargent's 
laudatio on Lucas's work, particularly his paper on expectations and the neutrality of money 
(1972) made it quite plain that Lucas substituted the "flagship of that earlier revolution, 
Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money" (Sargent 1996, 536). In 
contrast to Keynes's, Samuelson's and Solow's work, Lucas's writings were short and concise, 
and every reader understands what Lucas was talking about in his work, since he made clear 
what he really wanted to say. Although Lucas's view was not originally created by him since 
he referred to Friedman, Muth and Irving Fisher, the function of expectations and its impact 
on the non-effectiveness of policy was evident.  
  Some authors refer to the Lucas critique in a way that show a certain importance of 
recognizing that economics is a social science which is not guided by certain laws or by the 
law of gravity. Any regime change has to be implemented on the basis of changes in 
expectations and responses by the economic agents, thus leading to institutional changes. 
Regarding the practical usage of econometrics Mishkin stated: "policy evaluation with 
Keynesian econometric models involves an assumption that the parameter estimates in the 
model's equations which have been estimated from past data are invariant to changes in 
policy. (...) Lucas' challenge to this procedure for evaluating policies is based on a simple 
principle of rational expectations theory" (Mishkin 1995, 2).  
  Lucas pointed out an interdependency of the structure of the economy and a model 
suggesting that agents recognize both. Hoover (1991) argued that the Lucas critique is not 
itself identical to rational expectations as is often found in the literature.3 Rational expectation 
                                                 
2 See Blinder (1987). Rima (1988) presented a comprehensive work on this issue. 
3 Hoover (1991); see also Hoover (1998, 1997).   3
as modeled by Lucas can only treat risk, but not uncertainty. Lucas refers to Knight's 
distinction of risk and uncertainty without accepting it (Lucas 1981a, 125). The aim of 
rational expectations as defined by Lucas is to build a model that is not substantiated 
empirically (Lucas 1981a, 125). 
  Tobin (1993) did not celebrate the Lucas critique: "Jan Tinbergen is a modest man, 
and he never thought that econometric equations, his or others, would last foreever. I am sure 
he is now, and was fifty years ago, prepared to believe that clear changes of policy regimes, 
like other changes in the environment of economic activity, alter structural equations and their 
coefficients" (1993, 96). To sum up that point: Nowadays the Lucas critique is not used for a 
criticism of Keynesian macroeconomics as it was the case in 1976; it is used to express a 
common knowledge. I now want to turn towards some basic features of the Tinbergen model 
and the Lucas critique. 
2.  Lucas's view on Tinbergen  
This section deals with some features of both Tinbergen's view on the theory of 
economic policy he outlined in the 1950s and Lucas's interpretation of it.4 The Lucas critique 
focuses on Tinbergen's model, particularly the implication of expectations modeling. From a 
viewpoint of the history of macroeconomics it is interesting that the Lucas critique is (i) 
supposed to be identical with rational expectations and (ii) the object of Lucas's critique is 
supposed to be identical with Keynesian macroeconometrics and macroeconomics.5
2.1.  A note on Tinbergen's theory of economic policy 
  Tinbergen's formal approach economic theory and policy and view on the theory of 
policy was widely accepted among economists and the community of science. His approach 
                                                 
4 Tinbergen (1952) See also: Knoester, A./Wellink, A.H.E.M., 1993. (Eds). 
5 See Lawson (1995) for an instructive approach. 
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to economic theory was normative. He distanced himself from both the Manchester school of 
'laissez faire' which denied any effects of economic policy and the 'apriori-belief' of a socialist 
view which identified the state as a guarantor for social welfare. 
  Tinbergen emphasized the idea of steering the economy by certain instruments 
concerning particular economic variables. The object of the theory of economic policy is 
concerned with the findings of a social welfare function that he called the "collective 
ophelimity function". Individual preferences are to be seen as given. The deduction of policy 
targets from the indicator ophelimity function and the choice of appropriate instruments are 
the primary steps to be done. The determination of the quantitative values of the instrument 
variables and the formulation of a special proportion between targets and instruments are 
further steps to create a model of economic policy. These operative steps are dependent on 
each other: a choice of instruments is not independent of targets and indicators. 
  Tinbergen outlined many problems of this method, for instance, determining the 
structure of the economy. Evaluating the targets resulting from bargaining processes between 
distinct social groups, finding numerical values and identifying the nature of instrument 
variables is required. A model of the economy links instruments and targets and in principle 
makes it possible to steer a particular output by the process of maximizing the ophelimity 
function. With the determination of an optimum of this social welfare function it is also 
possible to calculate the social costs of a deviation from this optimum (loss function).  
  Besides the qualitative aspects Tinbergen has listed, he argued more attention should 
be drawn to quantitative aspects. In his formal theory of economic policy he distinguished 
between variables defined as policy instruments and other variables defined as objectives of 
policy makers. Policy instruments are to be interpreted as exogenous since their values are 
free to choose. Other policy instruments are exogenous as well because of some external 
conditions policy makers have to accept. Objectives are endogenous, their values are derived 
from exogenous variables. Tinbergen then differentiated between primary propositions and   5
secondary propositions. Primary propositions are guided by the inherent logical relation 
between the chosen variables which are determined by economic behavior or the logic of 
definition. Therefore a model can be separated into equations of supply, demand, definition, 
or technical equations which are linearly modeled. The secondary propositions are named side 
issues which should be understood as a corrector of linearity; they are non-equations. 
Tinbergen argued that they should mitigate the linearity.  
  It is hardly reasonable to interpret primary propositions as being determined both by 
economic behavior and premises, and therefore to confuse observations with premises as a 
logical starting point of theoretical reasoning. According to this distinction outlined by 
Tinbergen, the simple case is a compatibility of targets [t] and instruments [i]; but the 
occurrence of a non-compatibility, say [t < i ] or [t > i], is more likely. Furthermore there must 
be n-independent instruments. For instance, two instruments and two targets do not guarantee 
the final output since fiscal and monetary policy are collinear instruments. The consequences 
are that the outcome of a particular employment and inflation or aggregate supply and 
demand is due to a special policy mix regardless of whether one accepts the Phillips curve 
trade off or not. Besides that, there are many kinds of monetary sub-instruments which could 
be of interest for the results as a whole. 
2.2.  Tinbergen versus Lucas 
  Lucas's widely known article Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique, was 
published in 1976. He discussed the meaning and failures of "the theory of economic policy" 
based on the traditional meaning, referring to Tinbergen and the long run unemployment-
inflation trade-off of the Phillips curve which incorporates wage-price sectors. All of this 
needed to be revised. As Lucas (1981a) stated:  
"More particularly, I shall argue that the features which lead to success in short-
term forecasting are unrelated to quantitative policy evaluation, that the major   6
econometric models are (well) designed to perform the former task only, and that 
simulations using these models can, in principle, provide no useful information as 
to the actual consequences of alternative economic policies" (1981a, 105).  
Lucas disclaimed being the first one to have drawn attention to what he will later refer 
to as the 'hypothesis of rational expectations'.6
  Box 1 on this page demonstrates the Tinbergen or so-called traditional model. His 
approach to economic policy is based on an aggregate model; see equations (1) to (4). Lucas' 
critique on that is described with equations (5) to (6) on page 10. Now let me describe each 
equation of the model based on the presentation of Lucas. 
Box 1: Traditional Model of Economic Policy 
() ( , , ) 1 1 yf y x tt t + = t ε       
() (,,) (,,,) 2 fyx Fyx ε θ ε ≡  
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(4)      yF y x tt t + = 1 (,, ,) t θ ε  
Equation (1) shows an economy in a particular period t;  yt is the vector of endogenous 
variables; xt is the vector of exogenous variables and εt captures a vector of independent 
variables known as distributed random shocks; finally f  is not directly known and assumed to 
be fixed. This revealed the problem of policy makers since f is a result of an estimation. More 
precisely this estimation is a crucial factor in every macroeconometric model. For one period f  
can be incorporated in xt , which leads to equation (2). This equation shows how the view of 
an estimated f could be expressed by a vector θ. Lucas focused on the determination of this 
unknowable f since it relies on past values of xt. Therefore xt is "arbitrary" in a mathematical 
                                                 
6 Lucas was not the first to outline the invariance problem, as McCallum (1999). Lucas 
himself referred to Friedman, Muth and Knight (Lucas 1981, 106).   7
sense (Lucas 1981a, 106). Referring to (2) it is easy for policymakers to initiate policy 
advisories by a simple reapplication of past xt data into prospective values, i.e. into F.  
  How does the process of evaluation work? Given the functions F  and θ, a policy 
maker transforms equation (2) into equation (3). The implication of (3) is that the stochastic 
behavior of the given (yt , xt , εt ) is specified, defined in this sequence as random variables. 
This makes it possible to find out its specification by numerical simulation. Equation (4) 
shows that F and θ are deduced from decision rules of agents which are to be interpreted as 
suitable for a special environment. Lucas explored that the main problem is an estimation of θ 
which is compiled from past values and experience. He stressed only that in so far as θ or the 
observed policy is invariant, the estimated value of θ  will be invariant. "There is, as remarked 
above, no presumption that F, θ will be easy to discover, but it is the central assumption of the 
theory of economic policy that once they are (approximately) known, they will remain stable 
under arbitrary changes in the behavior of the forcing sequence" (Lucas 1981a, 110). He 
stated:  
"Everything we know about dynamic economic theory indicates that this 
presumption is unjustified. (...) To assume stability under alternative policy rules 
is thus to assume that agents' views about the behavior of shocks to the system are 
invariant under changes in the true behavior of these shocks. Without this extreme 
assumption, the kinds of policy simulations called for by the theory of economic 
policy are meaningless" (1981a, 111).  
The implication of θ is a model of adaptive expectations which is an obstacle not only 
to forecasting models but also to economic theory, Lucas argued. The traditional model is 
regularly used to transform supposed stable parameters into prospective values. Lucas 
confessed that it is certainly not the case that any economist who works with such a model is 
neither convinced of a stability of θ in the short run nor in the long run. From the point of   8
view held by Lucas, the defect of equations (1) to (4) is obvious, since a microeconomic 
approach is lacking. However microeconomic elements are necessary to demonstrate the 
supposed impacts of economic policy. 
  Lucas intended to show the microstructure, which is to be seen as a representation of 
individual behavior responding to economic policy. Therefore θ moves with policy changes 
more rapidly than expected in traditional models. His model of the theory of economic policy 
is expressed in equations (5) and (6). This structure promised to avoid the mistake of arbitrary 
sequences [xt] from future shocks. He modeled economic policies ("shocks") as stochastically 
disturbed functions of the system. Equation (5) shows its parametrical version; G is known, λ 
is a fixed parameter vector, and ηt is a vector of shocks. The economy is then determined by a 
special relationship between the behavioral parameter θ  and parameter λ which is guided by 
shocks. Any regime change will change λ as well. Any regime change affects λ and the 
behavior of xt, and therefore the behavioral parameters θ (λ). The latter concerns the economy 
as a whole. 
Box 2: Lucas's model 
(5) ( , , ) xG y ty = t λ η  
() ( , ,() , ) 6 1 yF y x tt t + = t θ λ ε  
  Lucas explained:  
"Evidently, the way this latter [(θ (λ)), EM.] modification can be expected to 
occur depends crucially on the way the policy change is carried out. (...) If, on the 
other hand, policy changes occur as fully discussed and understood changes in 
rules, there is some hope that the resulting structural changes can be forecast on 
the basis of estimation from past data of θ ( λ). (...) (According to Muth and 
Knight, EM) it asserts that agents' response become predictable to outside 
observers only when there can be some confidence that agents and observers share   9
a common view of the nature of the shocks which must be forecast by both" 
(1981a, 125). 
Lucas’s view leads to the proposition of a shared common view or common knowledge 
and would make a prophecy possible. As a result, Lucas did not accept it as empirical 
evidence (see Lucas 1981a, 25-6). 
  To sum up the Lucas critique, then, the estimation of θ is useful only for the regime 
for which is was established, but it is useless for alternative regimes and forecasting models. 
A specification of a workable model requires a modeling of the regime changes in case there 
will be any. In so far as macroeconomics and macroeconometrics use variables to demonstrate 
how the economy responds to new targets, it is required to have more justification for this 
than reference to past driven parameters. This is due to a different view on how private agents 
respond to a change in economic policy. They are not guided by past events and experience. 
A microfoundation as proposed by Lucas would abandon the aggregate structure, therefore 
leading the strong but not convincing assumption of a traditional model behind it. Since 
private agents anticipate monetary disturbances, any monetary policy is ineffective. Any real 
effects in the economy occur only through price level surprises, or in other words, differences 
between anticipated and non-anticipated monetary shocks. 
3. Lucasianism 
  The advent of Lucasianism, known as New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) in 
macroeconomic theory, was recognized in the early 1970's.7 NCM defined itself as a new 
paradigm opposed to the so-called Keynesian tradition. At this point it is worth to mentioning 
that this so-called Keynesian tradition was identified with the Tinbergen model as sketched 
above.  NCM and Monetarism particularly objects to the view of an inherent instability in the 
                                                 
7 An introduction gave Blinder (1997).  
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economy which needs to be governed by macropolicy. The argument strongly suggests that 
all instabilities and fluctuations in the economy are due to the erratic behavior of the 
authorities. The emergence of Lucasianism at this time can be explained by fundamental 
theoretical upheavals among economists and economic theory. First of all the phenomenon of 
stagflation led to controversies and terminological changes of traditional Keynesian notions.  
  Considering the history of macroeconomics, the consequence of the Lucas critique is 
more important than the proposition that agents will respond to a change in policy regimes or 
that parameters do not remain constant to changes in the policy regime. Keynes and 
Tinbergen would not have denied this proposition. The significant result of the Lucas critique 
and the 'rational expectations hypothesis' is that all changes in monetary policies, i.e., targets 
will be anticipated by private agents and therefore do not have any real effects in the 
economy. More precisely, all nominal magnitudes are useless for the economy since agents 
adapt their behavior to regime changes. The implication of this view is the hypothesis of a 
neutrality of money. 
3.1.  Some Principles of Lucasianism 
  The Lucasian paradigm rejected the view of adaptive expectations. The main pillars of 
Lucasianism are: (1) representative agent models and the 'rational expectations hypothesis'. 
(2) The rejection of Keynesian macroeconomics and macroeconometrics, and (3) the 
neutrality of money. These main premises then created a vertical Phillips curve which was 
interpreted as the monument of supra neutrality on macropolicy. 
  The first pillar was a challenge to both Monetarism and Keynesian since Lucasianism 
promised to provide a microfoundation for macroeconomics.8 In this sense it is to be seen as a 
                                                 
8 Sargent emphatically described the challenge:"Despite the appearance of its early 
incarnations like Lucas's 72 JET paper, the canons of rational expectations models - 
individual maximazation within a consistently understood environment - were evidently wide 
enough to include Lucas's elegant brand of monetarism" (1996, 545).    11
continuity of the neoclassical economy. It relies on methodological individualism which 
entered economic debates through the idea of marginalism represented by Walras, Gossen and 
Jevons, the founders of economics as a pure science. The microfoundation for 
macroeconomics was first of all a critique on the aggregate demand models since they could 
not bridge the gap between individual actions and preferences and the general output. 
  Methods of microfoundation are grounded on widely accepted instruments in 
economic theory: game theory, the Walrasian model of perfectly competitive general 
equilibrium and the model of representative agents. All of these instruments are applied in the 
field of economic investigation, but they have not replaced lamentable aggregate models. 
Given the flaws of aggregate models, microfoundation itself caused methodological problems 
of tautology, or of interference. Kirman, for instance, explored that a microfoundation was 
actually a claim for an integration of macroeconomics in Walrasian models. Kirman 
concluded: 
 "the problem seems to be embodied in what is an essential feature of a centuries-
long tradition in economics, that of treating individuals as acting independently of 
each other. (...). To argue in this way, however, suggests that once the appropriate 
signals are given, individuals behave in isolation and the result of their behaviour 
may simply be added together" (1989, 137). 
  The microfoundation for macroeconomy should be implemented by a representative 
agent model. A disaggregation of these models should have provided a method of analyzing 
individual activities on the basis of a suggested average behavior regarding macropolicy and 
to eliminate any reasons for a Lucas critique. Macropolicy was not assumed to be invariant 
for agents, on the contrary, macropolicy was due to an agent's response.  
However, the definition and specification of the utility function of the model led to 
further methodological questions on how economists could seriously know it. Regardless of 
the size of the group which the representative agent should represent, the representative agent   12
therefore became an essential part of the aggregate environment which governed his action. 
This could be the end of the story about NCM and Lucasianism repectively, if there were no 
further interesting details to tell. Representative agent models eliminate the aspect of 
coordination which is important in a decentralized economy.  
  Because dealing with all individually distinct utility functions is not that simple, a 
representative agent model is reduced to a single function for the average (supposed) 
response. This reduction should depict how the representative agent will change his decision 
in light of a new policy. More precisely the picture which arose out of this method was not 
different from the aggregative model. "The representative agent turned out to be a 
macroeconomic model in disguise. It did not solve the aggregation problem; it merely hid it. It 
did not solve the problem of keeping exogenous and endogenous variables straight; it 
obfuscated it. And ultimately, the final indignity came when the representative agent turned 
out not to be a microeconomic model at all. (...) The Lucas critique was obviously true but 
unfortunately unsolvable" (Hartley 1997, 199).  
  The intention of the representative agent model was highly ambitious. Its 
methodological starting point failed since given aggregates therefore configure the scope for a 
decision and action of the agent. The consequence is that the representative agent model 
which was forced to avoid the untenable and "unrealistic" performance of aggregative 
economy mutated to a justification for aggregative models. Therefore the representative agent 
model is not an implementation of the microfoundation for macroeconomy because it 
represents a certain feature of the microeconomy. 
  Besides the representative agent as outlined above, the 'hypothesis of rational 
expectations' (REH) was celebrated as a theoretical refinement applied now to economics by 
Lucas and Lucasians. All of the academic debates seem to produce further theoretical defense 
strategy attempts to protect this REH. The rationality of the Lucas critique and Lucasians   13
occurs only in stable environments in which rational agents, endowed with rational 
expectations, anticipate the regime choice.9 Hoover, then resumed:  
"The root of the problem is this: economic theory uses variables to describe 
economic processes which are not observable; observable variables are, in part, 
the outcome of interactions among these unobservables, and without further 
information it is, in general, not possible to infer the behavior of the 
unobservables from the observables" (1991, 190). 
This divergence of observable and unobservable entities is solved, so it is said, by the 
NCM by an incorporation of the REH.10 The identification of economic policy with a 
divergence of observable and unobservable, as maintained by Hoover, is perhaps one way to 
deal with uncertainty, without being convincing; the hypothesis of rational expectations is not 
observable at all.  
  No doubt, the REH is misleading for at least two main reasons. First: The hypothesis 
of rational expectations implies a convergence of the "true model" which is perceivable and 
acknowledged by the economic agents and their expectations. This premise is hardly 
acceptable. Second: Permanent or systematic mistakes by the agents are excluded. 
Furthermore: REH advocates Knight's definition of risk which has to be distinguished from 
uncertainty. The latter is not insurable, as Keynes had stated. 
The premise of a stable environment excludes explanations on how representative 
agents learn. The agents in the model of REH are forming expectations on the basis of a 'true 
model' of the economy which is identical with the model of the NCM itself. Therefore REH is 
                                                 
9 Blinder outlined:"I think the weight of the evidence – both from directly observed 
expectations and from indirect statistical tests of rationality (usually in conjunction with some 
other hypothesis)I – is overwhelming against the RE hypothesis" (1987, 131). 
10  For a further investigation on questions of the accused incompatibility of models with facts 
or events, see Muchlinski (1998 2003, 2003a). 
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addressed only to a special model of rational expectations building. It is important to 
distinguish rational expectations in the manner of rational human behavior and perceive of 
information from the model of REH. The second pillar can be briefly described by the 
intention of Lucasians to reject both Keynesian macroeconometric models and the idea of a 
sound macropolicy. The aim of the NCM was a replacement of Keynesian macroeconomics 
and macroeconometrics with models avoiding the Lucas critique based on an adherence to 
REH. This should have led to refinements of equilibrium models and finally to the real 
business cycle models. The latter is not part of my concern here.11  
  According to some authors the Lucas critique led to theoretical improvements, for 
instance to models of time consistency.12 The success of macropolicy depends on 
precommitments to a particular policy regime. "Achieving credibility has thus become an 
important goal for policymakers" (Mishkin 1995, 22). The theorem of rules versus discretion 
is a further refinement of that idea. It tries to explain the reputation and the desirability of pre-
commitment by central banks.13  
Other authors objected to central assumptions of Lucasianism (Blinder 1999, Goodhart 
1994).14 The assumption of surprise inflation and the willingness of the central bank to fool 
private agents by abandoning the announced target of monetary policy is hardly acceptable. 
Moreover, as Cukierman investigated, "the credibility problem of monetary policy is a thing 
of the past".15 From the viewpoint of the Bank of England, Vickers outlined: "It should go 
without saying that the MPC's objectives are given by the Act and by the remit set by the 
Chancellor. There is a large literature on inflation bias, but it is simply not applicable to the 
                                                 
11 See Cooley (1994) 
12 Kydland/Prescott (1977) 
13 As Blinder (1998, 37) comments some implications of basic premises of the NCM:"The 
harsh but simple fact is that no central bank directly controls inflation, unemployment, or 
nominal GDP - as an economic theorist would like to pretend otherwise". 
14 Blinder (1999) and Goodhart (1994); Boland also offered an interesting approach (1998).  
15 Cukierman (2002).   15
MPC. We have no desire to spring inflation surprises to try to bump output above its natural 
rate (wherever that may be). Quite apart from the obligation to fulfill our statutory duty, we 
have the strongest professional and reputation incentives, which in my opinion are incapable 
of being enhanced by financial incentives, to get as close as we can to the inflation target" 
(Vickers 1998, 6).  
 
Therefore the theoretical assumptions of the KPBG model do not make any sense. There 
seems to be no dispute about that issue between central banks itself: "If the monetary 
authority can be clearer about what it is doing now and plans to do – not in the sense of 
setting future moves in stone, but rather in terms of explaining risks that might influence 
future policy – then market participants can improve their expectations of future short rates, 
and possibly reduce the premium for uncertainty" (Ferguson 1999, 2). Disputes in theoretical 
debates have not been reaching the realm of central bank practice, which focuses on 
effectiveness of monetary policy as practice and tries to avoid assumptions that are not linked 
to the contemporary world.  
An admitted fact is the asymmetry of time horizons of the different agents in different 
markets and the central bank. The goal of price stability is a long lasting objective a central 
bank can only try to achieve by acting in short time horizons, which may conflict with the 
interests of market participants. Cukierman makes his objection: "The quadratic objective 
function originally postulated by KPBG carries the rather unintuitive implication that, given 
inflation, an upward deviation of employment from its desired level is as costly as a 
downward deviation of the same size. It is hard to see, why policymakers, or social planners 
for that matter, would object, given inflation, to a positive output gap. As a matter of fact it's 
quite likely that, in the range of positive output gaps, the quadratic was postulated mainly for 
analytical convenience rather than for its descriptive realism" (Cukierman 2002, 16).   16
This model of interaction demonstrates first the supposed homogeneity of private 
agents and an invariant divergence between both agents and the central bank. Blinder (1998) 
stated that the alleged temptation of central bankers for an inflation surprise in models of the 
time consistency literature asserts the capability of a central bank to solve inflation through a 
rule and that there is an "inflation bias" problem. This postulates that an abandonment from an 
announced monetary target focuses on the behavior of the central bankers neglecting 
historical facts and events. Once it happens, private agents will not tolerate it anymore, 
therefore the central bank loses its credibility. The premise of fooling does not have any link 
to the contemporary world (Keynes) that is the perceived world and therefore the premise 
should be interpreted as a dry bone.16
  As Blinder explaines "recent history has not been kind to the view that central banks 
have an inflationary bias" (1998, 40). The reference to a historical argument did not express 
the attempt of a falsification of a hypothesis since Blinder has already mentioned that models 
should have a link to reality, otherwise it is not clear what the discussion is about. Concerning 
solutions for uncertainty in forecasting model selection and parameters, Blinder explained 
"my intuition tells me that this finding is more general - or at least more wise - in the real 
world than the mathematics will support" (1998, 12). Although the REH has been initiated to 
a specification  by new classical models, it has not replaced Keynesian macroeconometrics 
and macroeconomics.17
                                                 
16 Keynes (1938, 33). 
17 Blinder (1998, 6) described, that the Tinbergen-Theil framework could be seen as one of 
many models capturing important aspects on central bank policy. In this model, some 
variables are endogenous and others are exogenous. The Tinbergen-Theil model does not 
work on the assumption the central bank could control either the inflation rate or the 
unemployment rate. Against those criticism who deny any relevance of models since there is 
no knowledge on the "true" or "right" model at all, Blinder outlines, that "speaking now as a 
former central banker, I think such know-nothingism is not a very useful attitude. In fact, in 
my view, we must use the Tinbergen-Theil approach - with as many of the complication as we 
can handle - even if in a quite informal way".   17
  The problems identified with Keynesian macroeconomics and macroeconometrics 
interpreted by advocates of Lucasianism is rather due to their interpretation of Keynes's view 
than to Keynes himself (see my next paragraph). This method of stylized opinion regarding 
Keynesian policy was the starting point to demand a shift in the paradigms to Lucasianism. 
Remarkably, Keynesian macromodels are not out of fashion today. "As the result, the Lucas 
critique of policy evaluation using Keynesian macroeconometric models does affect the way 
policymakers make use of these models" (Mishkin 1995, 22). Policymakers have been 
drawing more attention to expectations. 
  The third pillar of Lucasianism caused an important controversy within 
macroeconomics. If expectations are rational, monetary policy cannot produce systematic 
gaps between the actual and announced inflation. The incorporation of REH implies a 
neutrality of money. The hypothesis of the neutrality of money was advocated originally by 
Friedman in 1968.18 Lucas was devoted to this proposition with more radicalism and rigor. 
According to the discussion about the Phillips curve, Lucas and Lucasianism objected to the 
long termed trade off between unemployment and inflation as stated by A.W. Phillips and 
Samuelson/Solow. This opened up never ending controversies within the economy of science 
as is widely known, so I am sure I can be brief on that point.19
  The hypotheses of rational expectations and neutrality of money are significant 
features of the new paradigm by Lucas & Lucasianism.20 Hahn objected to the this  paradigm 
as follows:  
                                                 
18 The presidential address to the American Economic Association (AEA)  by Friedman 
implemented the concept of NAIRU, the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment. 
which implies that inflation will increase if unemployment remain below its natural rate. 
19 Further details on the history and implications of the Phillips curve are provided by 
Staiger/Stock/Watson (1997). 
20 Sargent (1996, 543) objected to the interpretation that there is triade of the hypotheses of 
'rational expectations', 'neutrality' and 'policy ineffectiveness' in Lucas's work, since present 
papers on equilibrium models are concerned with different monetary and fiscal policy 
arrangements.    18
"Money, so the jargon goes is not only neutral, but 'superneutral'. The inflation 
rate, at least in the long run, is thus irrelevant to the real state of the economy and 
is simply governed by the rate of increase in the monetary stock" (1982, 71-2).  
This new paradigm became important for a few years shortly after Lucas and Sargent's 
publication of After Keynesian Macroeconomics (1979). Hahn stated that if the economy 
cannot go beyond the rational expectations equilibrium as maintained by Lucas and the NCM, 
why should inflation be a problem at all? An answer has not yet been given. Hahn concludes: 
"the present neurotic preoccupation with inflation cannot come from agents who 
live in a Sagent-Wallace world. Recall again that no one is supposed to be 
permanently fooled. Remember also that there are no distribution effects from 
inflation in a rational expectations world" (1982, 102).  
Hahn resisted following the new paradigm because: 
"Lucas's contribution then is this. He showed how unpredictability or 
unobservability of monetary policy could interfere with the information-revealing 
function of prices, and how this could be the source not only of real effects, but of 
real effects that the macro-literature had noted. (...) Rational expectations 
equilibria are unique and the economy is always in rational expectations 
equilibrium. Appearance belie reality" (1982, 45-6). 
  To sum up this paragraph: The claim for a microfoundation of macroeconomy is not 
undisputed in the literature. The question remains unanswered of whether microfoundation is 
necessary to explore economic behavior in a decentralized economy and to understand the 
process of acquiring knowledge. Therefore the methodological disputes on microfoundation 
versus macrofoundation still concern contemporary economists (Leijonhufvud 1996).   19
4.  Keynes's critique on Tinbergen 
  Keynes's critique on econometrics is viewed in the literature as "Keynes's critique on 
Tinbergen". Its epistemological relevance is emphasized by Brown-Collier/Bausor (1988) and 
Muchlinski (1996). Its methodological meaning, for instance, has been outlined by Hillard 
(1992) and Carabelli (1988). Some authors made objections against Keynes's critique arguing 
that he had not really understood what Tinbergen was talking about (Klant 1985, Phelps 
1979). Appropriately, it is said that he did not accept the significance of mathematics and 
methods of measurement for economic phenomena.  
  Rima for instance wrote "econometric research has become, for many, the sine qua 
non of economic science. This development is clearly inconsistent with Keynes's reservations 
about the usefulness of statistical probability to explain economic outcome that come into 
being under uncertainty. The vision of the real world to which Keynes first gave expression in 
A Treatise on Probability and which provided the epistemic foundation for the General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money is a perspective which is conceptually 
incompatible with the mid-century transformation of economics that has accompanied the 
formalist revolution" (1988, 19-20).  
  This interpretation is hardly acceptable since Keynes wrote a treatise on problems of 
indexation, its methods and application of economic questions in 1908 (C.W., XI, 49-159) 
and a remarkable treatise concerned with "statistics" (C.W., XI, 174-237).21 Besides that his 
Treatise on Probability, a book which was published in 1921 but had already been written in 
its main parts in 1908, is concerned with questions of the theory of knowledge, problems of 
measurements, statistical methods and explanations, methods of reasoning, and induction. 
These are important issues for economics as a social science; further contributions are to be 
                                                 
21 For a critical assessment on econometrics today, see Summers (1991).   20
found in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), and the Collected 
Writings in different volumes. I will comment on this in the next paragraph. 
4.1. Divergences 
  Keynes objected against centrally implicit premises of Tinbergen's work in 1938 and 
1940. Particularly, the assumptions of (i) linearity, (ii) homogeneity, (iii) independency, (iv) 
the choice of variables, (v) the ignored time lags and (vi) reversibility. Keynes was asked by a 
Mr. Tyler to write a comment on Tinbergen's book. In the very first commentary addressed to 
Mr. Tylor, Keynes criticized the lack of explanations on the applied methods. Tinbergen has 
presented a "cryptic method of exposition" (C.W., XIV, 285).22  
  Keynes stated: "There is first of all the central question of methodology, the logic of 
applying the method of multiple correlation to unanalysed economic material, which we know 
to be nonhomogeneous through time. If we are dealing with the action of numerically 
measurable, independent forces, adequately unanalysed so that we knew we were dealing with 
independent atomic factors and between them completely comprehensive, acting with 
fluctuating relative strength on material constant and homogeneous through time, we might be 
able to use the method of multiple correlation with some confidence for disentangling the 
laws of their action; (...) In fact we know that every one of these conditions is far from being 
satisfied by the economic material under investigation. How far does this impair the validity 
of the method? That seems to me to deserve a most careful preliminary enquiry. The volume 
which purports to be 'a note on the method' in fact faces none of these difficulties and is in 
fact mainly occupied, just like the other volume, with elaborate half-explained numerical 
examples, the method employed in which already begs the question" (C.W., XIV, 285-6). The 
                                                 
22The reply by Tinbergen is outlined as a defense of his applied methods (C.W. XIV, 293) in:  
The Economic Journal 1940, No. 50, 141-154.   21
application of multiple correlation is questionable since the material to which it is applied is 
not suitable. 
  The predominance of deductive reasoning is a further inadequacy for economics as a 
social science. Keynes emphasized the relevance of inductive reasoning in economics. He 
stated: "It seems to me that economics is a branch of logic, a way of thinking. (...) Progress in 
economics consists almost entirely in a progressive improvement in the choice of models. (...) 
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models 
which are relevant to the contemporary world" (C.W., XIV, 295-6, Letter to R.F. Harrod, 4. 
July 1938). Every single choice of a model is due to inductive elements. Whereas model 
building is the appropriate theoretical approach, deduction as a way of reasoning should be 
judged with caution. Keynes's methodological reflections are not restricted to the criticism of 
econometrics. According to contemporary debates on methodological issues in economics, 
Keynes's contributions are important. Therefore his confession to Mr. Tylor that he has "the 
utmost difficulty in making heads or tails of" Tinbergen's work, which should be "partly due 
to my lack of familiarity with the matter" is to be seen as an understatement (C.W., XIV, 
285). 23
  Keynes's reply to Tinbergen's book illustrated his theoretical approach to economics. 
His criticism of econometrics and its implication should be taken as warnings, as claims for 
reflections and awareness of these problems. Tinbergen’s writings on investment, decision-
making and business cycles had amassed descriptions of statistics and statistical methods to 
demonstrate the validity of central premises such as linearity, homogeneity and 
interdependency of the chosen variables with each other. This procedure was not acceptable 
by Keynes. He presented a theory unaccompanied by empirical data that explained for 
instance, involuntary unemployment through inadequate aggregate demand as pessimistic 
                                                 
23 More details on problems of model building is given by Mayer (1996).   22
expectations about uncertainty. Furthermore, he replaced the non-acceptable premises of 
classical theory with those premises, which are relevant to contemporary world. Uncertainty 
and precariousness about, for instance, "prospective yields" of an investment (Keynes 1936, 
135), and therefore the role of expectations leads to a distinct theoretical approach to 
economic questions. 
  Keynes criticized Tinbergen's methods because of misguiding modelling:"The pseudo-
analogy with the physical sciences leads directly counter to the habit of mind which is most 
importance for an economist proper to acquire. (...) One has to be constantly on guard against 
treating the material as constant and homogeneous. It is as though the fall of the apple to the 
ground depended on the apple's motives, on whether it is worth while falling to the ground, 
and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of 
the apple as to how far it was from the centre of the earth" (1938, C.W., XIV, 299-300).  
  Keynes did not supply the view that economic variables are to be seen as constant and 
homogenous through time. He referred to the crucial point in Tinbergen's work of taking past 
data and statistics to infer future values from them. A precise question addressed to Tinbergen 
was whether he had drawn any attention to expectations. In the following quotation one can 
perceive Keynes's sceptical view. The application of statistical methods and measurements is 
due to theoretical assumptions which Tinbergen did not make explicitly. This is an 
impediment to achieving validity and credibility in his work. Keynes asked: "How are these 
coefficients arrived at? Is it by laborious trail-and-error guessing, or by method? How are the 
time lags arrived at? Is it by common sense guessing or by method? (...) Is it assumed that the 
factors investigated are comprehensive and that they are not merely a partial selection out of 
all the factors at work? How much difference does it make to the method if they are not 
comprehensive? Is it claimed that there is a likelihood that the equations will work 
approximately next time? (...) Is it assumed that the future is a determinate function of past 
statistics? What place is left for expectation and the state of confidence relating to the future?   23
What place is allowed for non-numerical factors, such as inventions, politics, labour troubles, 
wars, earthquakes, financial crises? One feels a suspicion that the choice of factors is 
influenced (...) by what statistics are available, and that many vital factors are ignored because 
they are statistically intractable or unprocurable. (...). Now I quite agree that it would not be 
easy to apply the method to these factors. But that seems to me a justification for not using the 
method in this case rather than for ignoring these matters and telling us what we know alredy 
with the trimmings of figures which really have no significance" (1938, C.W., XIV, 286-288). 
  All of these implicit premises need to be explained and made explicit: the assumptions 
of linearity, reversibility, homogeneity as well as the supposed independencies of the 
variables. "One would have liked to be told emphatically what is involved in the assumption 
of linearity. It means that the quantitative effect of any causal factor on the phenomenon 
under investigation is directly proportional to the factor's own magnitude" (Keynes C.W., 
XIV, 312). "Is there any ground for the suspicion that the assumption of linearity rules out 
cyclical factors?" (C.W., XIV, 313). This question was the subject of an interesting debate 
between economists, e.g. the question on how investments are determined and how profits are 
to be seen as the crucial element of an investment decision or not. As I have already 
mentioned, Keynes emphasized the "prospective yields" as significant for the investment 
decision and not, as argued in the classical theory, the given amount of profit. Tinbergen 
made no distinction between both.  
  Furthermore, Keynes cautioned against the hypothesis of reversibility. "Where and 
how does the element of reversal come in? I ask this question without pretending to answer it. 
But I should like to know the answer" (C.W., XIV, 313). Besides that no explanation is given 
in Tinbergen's work of how the trimmings of figures move during an investigation of such 
factors determining these trimmings of figures. Finally the treatment of time lags deserves 
more clarity for the reader. Keynes remarked that "no example is given of the process of 
determining time lags which appear, when they come, ready-made. (...) This he seems to do   24
by some sort of trial-and-error method. That is to say, he fidgets about until he finds a time 
lag which does not fit in too badly with the theory he is testing and with the general 
presuppositions of this methods" (C.W., XIV, 314). Regarding the definition of trends open 
questions remain. The underlying time periods seem to be arbitrary since Tinbergen selected 
different time periods for the United States and United Kingdom to demonstrate how he dealt 
with the same question. No justification is given to this divergence of time periods. 
  In summary, we then come to the next question Keynes addressed to Tinbergen: "How 
far are these curves and equations meant to be no more than a piece of historical curve-fitting 
and description, and how far do they make inductive claims with reference to the future as 
well as the past?" (C.W., XIV, 315). Keynes presented his investigations of inductive 
arguments and reasoning in the Treatise on Probability. The validity of an inductive argument 
definitely depends on the length of the underlying period or sub-periods since the regression 
coefficient for each period will change with the choice of the period itself.  
  Finally Keynes objected to the hypothesis of independence. "Must we push our 
preliminary analysis to the point at which we are confident that the different factors are 
substantially independent of one another? This is not discussed. Yet I think it is important. 
For, if we are using factors which are not wholly independent, we lay ourselves open to the 
extraordinarily difficult and deceptive complications of 'spurious' correlation" (C.W., XIV, 
309). "I infer that he considers independence of no importance. But my mind goes back to the 
days when Mr. Yule sprang a mine under the contraptions of optimistic statisticians by his 
discovery of spurious correlation. (...) It becomes like those puzzles for children where you 
write down your age, multiply, add this and that, substract something else, and eventually end 
up with the number of the Beast in Revelation. (...) Thus it is sometimes a rate and sometimes 
an absolute quantity; and when in the final outcome he multiply this hotch-potch, sometimes 
by a large coefficient and sometimes by a small one, and then substracts from it the rate of 
interest multiplied (usually) by a small coefficient" (C.W., XIV, 310-311). The analogy of   25
Tinbergen's method with hotch-potch is an illustration of the missing theory Keynes claimed 
and leads to a lack of clarity in the applied methods. 
  
4.2. Some  generalizations 
  Having introduced central objections Keynes made against Tinbergen's work, it is 
quite obvious that expectation is a key notion in Keynes's economic thinking. He came to this 
view in his fundamental critique on the classical view of Benthamite calculation.24 In contrast 
to that, he outlined his metatheoretical or methodological view rejecting natural sciences as an 
inappropriate approach to economics. Moral science in modern terms could be expressed as a 
social science. 
  Surprisingly none of the authors who devotionally follow Lucas and Lucasiansm refer 
to Keynes's criticism. This could have avoided deep misunderstanding of what Keynes said. 
The common sense in economics nowadays is to accuse Keynesian macroeconometrics and 
macroeconomics of having neglected the importance of expectations. The widespread 
accepted identification of Tinbergen's model of macropolicy with Keynes's view caused a 
misunderstanding of the core of his criticism of econometrics. His proviso with the presented 
methods was in no way an expression of model nihilism, since he has already explained 
significant aspects of model building in economics. One has to be aware that economic 
material is non-linear, non-reversible, non-homogeneous, not independent of one another and 
which has to be judged on the basis of time lags. It is necessary to choose those variables 
which are not only suitable but also important to the purpose in question. 
                                                 
24 Classical theory seeks to reduce uncertainty to the same epistemological status as certainty 
by using mathematical calculus (Keynes, C.W., XIV 213).   26
  Many of Keynes's objections against econometric work can be reread in the current 
literature on the topic of sound macropolicy and how it works.25 Blinder for instance 
considers the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) in the USA:"Some kind 
of a model, however informal, is necessary to do policy, for otherwise how can you even 
begin to estimate the effects of changes in policy instruments." (...) "Central bank do, too. Or 
at least they should, for they will surely fail in their stabilization-policy mission if they simply 
'put out fires' as they observe them" (Blinder 1998, 7). All models must have a link to the 
"contemporary world", as Keynes argued. This view by Keynes is known as the Lucas 
critique which "warn us that some parameters may change when policy does. Yet what are we 
to do about these problems? Be skeptical? Of course. Use several methods and models instead 
of just one? Certainly. But abandon all econometric modeling? I think not" (Blinder 1998, 8). 
This is the contribution Keynes outlined emphasizing that the economy is a way of thinking in 
terms of models. 
  Blinder (1998) elaborates in some arguments having contextual importance. Macro-
policy relies on models, both macroeconomics and macroeconometrics are concerned with 
special problems of model building. These are in short:  
  (1) The unknown "true model". In fact any choice of a model implies uncertainty if the 
emphasized proposition is a "true" one. There is no way out of uncertainty.  Blinder refers to 
the distinction of uncertainty and risk in Knight's terminology (1921) explaining why 
uncertainty rather than risk is a problem in model building. "Risk arises when a random 
variable has a known probability distribution; uncertainty arises when the distribution is 
unknown" (1998, 77). Since the distribution of uncertainty is persistently and categorically 
unknown (because there is no such distribution), there is no chance of eliminating uncertainty 
through model building.  
                                                 
25 See for instance Morishima (1991).  
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  (2) Uncertainty in the forecast. This problem can be methodically solved by replacing 
the unknown future variables with "their expected values" defined as the "certainty 
equivalence" principle. This operation looks easier than it is because of the great amount of 
unknown exogenous variables which have to be integrated in the model. Furthermore this 
method is problematic because of the non-linearity of the economy and serious doubt that the 
objective function is quadratic. But who knows the objective function? Since no one have 
ever found a justification of "an objective" function, nor given it, practical economists or 
central bankers must create such a function. Again, the purpose of model building is due to 
problems of the contemporary world therefore "policymakers almost always will be 
contemplating changes in policy instruments that can be expected to lead to small changes in 
macroeconomic variables" (Blinder 1998, 10).  
  (3) Uncertainty about parameters. Blinder refers to Brainard (1967) to describe that 
uncertainty about parameters should lead to a more or less conservative behavior of the 
central bankers, i.e. assuming the lowest movement of parameters.  
  (4) Uncertainty about model selection. This problem is connected with the first three 
aspects and there is no chance to avoid a choice of models among many others. Relying on a 
universal model would be the worst case, rather than using a wide variety of different models 
with a reasonable critique.  
  (5) Finally, Blinder emphasized the "long and variable lags" macroeconometrics and 
macroeconomics have to recognize. "It is essential, in my view, for central bankers to realize 
that, in a dynamic economy with long lags in monetary policy, today's monetary policy 
decision must be thought of as the first step along a path. The reason is simple: Unless you 
have thought through your expected future actions, it is impossible to make today's decision 
rationally "(1998, 14). To summarize these considerations one has to be on guard about 
relying on simple rules concerning economic questions. The brief reconsideration of both   28
Keynes and Blinder has shown that the criticism of model building in macroeconomics and 
macroeconometrics is relevant. 
  Leeson states that Tinbergen himself vindicated parts of the Keynes's critique a long 
time after their dispute. Tinbergen, interviewed by Magnus/Morgan (1987), admitted his 
scepticism. Magnus/Morgan asked: "How do you feel about the way econometrics has 
developed over the last twenty years or so? In 1952 you feared that techniques could take over 
from attention to human needs and problems in the field of economics. Do you feel this fear 
was justified?" Tinbergen replied: "I'm afraid, yes" (1998, 55). Leeson furthermore 
demonstrates that Friedman, who was acquainted with the use and abuse of statistics and 
econometrics, "took over much of the Keynes critique and made it his own. Yet the evaluation 
of econometric evidence became the 'space-time' arena of the disputes between Keynesians 
and monetarists" (1998, 67). Friedman agreed with Keynes in many of his objections, as 
Leeson enlightens. Take for instance the model selection problem, the methods of regression 
and correlation or the problem of applying mathematics to the economy, all of this can be 
reread in Friedman's work (see Leeson 1998, 73-77). "Just as Keynes did, Friedman cautioned 
against economic theory becoming a species of 'disguised mathematics... a retreat into purely 
formal or tautological analysis" (Leeson 1998, 76). Like Friedman, Keynes did not identify 
science or scientific results with mathematical symbols.  "Those writers who try to be strictly 
formal generally have no substance" (Keynes, C.W., XXIX, 37-8). Keynes's view on 
mathematics was not due to a dualism of formal versus real since "reality" is defined as 
"contemporary world", i.e. the perceived or experienced world, and a model is just a way of 
thinking about it. 
5. Concluding remarks 
  Considering the history of macroeconomics, the emergence of the Lucas critique and 
Lucasianism seemed to have caused a terminological revolution in macroeconomics and led   29
to a replacement of so-called Keynesian macroeconometrics and macroeconometrics. The 
three pillars of Lucasianism, representative agent models, rational expectations hypothesis, 
and neutrality of money, failed to convince the community of science. As investigated in this 
paper, the prophecy of a replacement of old-fashioned models was not kept. The exegetical 
story of Lucas & Lucasianism refers to Tinbergen criticizing his Keynesian view of the theory 
of economic policy, while Keynes had objected to Tinbergen's model a long time ago. There 
is no textual evidence that Keynes agreed with Tinbergen while Lucas disagreed with 
Tinbergen. The Lucas critique advanced the macroeconomic literature leaving the sphere of 
econometrics behind it. Some authors refer to the Lucas critique in a way that shows the 
importance of recognizing that economics is a social science which is not guided by certain 
laws or by the law of gravity or by numbers. Any regime change has to be implemented on 
the basis of changes in expectations and responses by economic agents. This common 
knowledge once implemented by Keynes, then used by Lucas and Lucasianism to substitute 
Keynesian macroeconomics, regardless of what Keynes did say, is now applied to aspects of 
model building. 
6. Bibliography 
Blinder, A. S., 1999. Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It? 
NBER Working Paper Series 7161, Cambridge, MA.        
Blinder, A.S., 1998. Central Banking in Theory and Practice (The Lionel Robbins Lectures). 
The MIT Press, Cambridge/Massachusetts. 
Blinder, A.S., 1997. What Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics and Vice Versa. In: 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 2, 3-19. 
Blinder, A.S., 1987.  Keynes, Lucas, and Scientific Progress. In: American Economic Review, 
Vol. 77, 130-136.   30
Boland, Lawrence A., 1998. Knowledge in Economics: Game-Theoretic versus Market-
Process: A Review Article. In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 45, No. 5, 604-
613. 
Brown-Collier, E./Bausor, R., 1988. The Epistemology Foundations of the General Theory. 
In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 3, 227-241. 
Carabelli, A., 1988. On Keynes' Method. London:Macmillan. 
Colander, D. , 1996. Beyond Microfoundations: Post Walrasian Macroeconomics. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Colander, D. , 1996a. The Macrofoundations of Micro. In: Colander, D. (1996) Beyond 
Microfoundations: Post Walrasian Macroeconomics. Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-68. 
Cooley, T. F., 1994. Frontiers of Business Cycle Research. Princeton UP. 
Cukierman, A., 2002. Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent About Economic Models 
and Objectives and What Differences Does It Make? In: The Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, 15-35.  
Ferguson, R. W., 1999. Transparency and Responsibility in Monetary Policy. Remarks before 
the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1999. URL: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/
Goodhart, C., 1994. Game Theory for Central Bankers – A Report to the Governor of the 
Bank of England. In: Journal of Economic Literature, 32, 101-114. 
Hahn, F., 1982. Money and Inflation. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Hartley, J. E., 1997. The Representative Agent in Macroeconomics. London and New York. 
Hillard, J., 1992. Keynes, Orthodoxy and Uncertainty. In: Gerrard, B./Hillard, J. (Eds.), The 
Philosophy and Economics of J.M.Keynes, Edward Elgar, London, pp. 59-79. 
Hoover, K.D., 1998. New Classical Macroeconomics. In: Davis, J. B./Hands, D.W./Mäki, U. 
(Eds.), The Handbook of Economic Methodology. Cheltenham/Northampton, pp. 333-339.   31
Hoover, K.D., 1997. Is There a Place For Rational Expectations in Keynes's General Theory? 
In: Harcourt, G.C./ Riach, P.A.  (Eds.),  A 'Second Edition' Of The General Theory, Volume 
1, London, pp. 219-237. 
Hoover, K. D., 1991. The New Classical Macroeconomics. A Sceptical Inquiry. 
Cambridge/Massachussetts. 
Howitt, K.D., 1997.  Expectations and Uncertainty in Contemporary Keynesian Models. In: 
Harcourt, G.C./ Riach, P.A. (Eds.),  A 'Second Edition' Of The General Theory, Volume 1, 
London, pp. 238-260. 
Keynes, J.M., 1979. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Moggridge, D., (Ed.), 
Volume XXIX The General Theory and After. A Supplement, Macmillan Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 37-8.  
Keynes, J.M., 1939.  Professor Tinbergen's Method. In: Collected Writings, XIV, Cambridge, 
pp. 306-318. 
Keynes, J.M., 1938.  Letter from 16 July 1938 to R.F. Harrod. In: Collected Writings, XIV, 
pp. 299-301. 
Keynes, J.M., 1938. Collected Writings, X, p. 33).  
Keynes, J.M., 1936.  The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Cambridge. 
Keynes, J.M., 1932.  Notes on Fundamental Terminology. Collected Writings, XXIX, 
Cambridge, pp. 35-42. 
Keynes, J.M., 1921. A Treatise on Probability. Cambridge. 
Keynes, J.M., 1908.  Index Numbers. In: Collected Writings, Vol. XI, pp. 49-173. 
Keynes, J.M., 1908.   Statistics. In: Collected Writings, Vol. XI, pp. 174-237. 
Kirman, A. P., 1992. Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent? In: 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. Volume 6, Number 2, Spring 1992, 117-136. 
Kirman, A.P., 1989. The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The Emperor Has No 
Clothes. In: The Economic Journal, 99 (conference 1989), 126-139.   32
Knoester, A./Wellink, A.H.E.M., 1993, (Eds.), Tinbergen Lectures on Economic Policy. 
Amsterdam/London/New York/Tokyo. 
Kydland, F./Prescott, E., 1977. Rules rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal 
Plan. In: Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-491. 
Lawson, T., 1995. The Lucas Critique: A Generalisation. In: Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 19, 257-276. 
Leijonhufvud, A., 1996.  Towards a not-too-Rational Macroeconomics. In: Colander, D., 
1996, Beyond Microfoundations: Post Walrasian Macroeconomics. Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 39-55. 
Leeson, R., 1998. The Ghost I Called I Can't Get Rid of Now: The Keynes-Tinbergen-
Friedman-Phillips Critique of Keynesian Macroeconometrics. In: History of Political 
Economy 30:1, 51-94. 
Lucas, R.E., 1986. Principles of Fiscal and Monetary Policy. In: Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 17, 117-134. 
Lucas, R.E. , 1981 (Ed.), Studies in Business-Cycle Theory. Oxford. 
Lucas, R.E., 1981a/1976.  Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique. In: Lucas, R.E. (Ed.) 
Studies in Business-Cycle Theory. Oxford, pp. 104-130. 
Lucas, R.E., 1981b.  Tobin und Monetarism: A Review Article. In: Journal of Economic 
Literature, 19 (2),  558-567. 
Lucas, R.E., 1981c/1972. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 4, pp. 103-124. Reprinted in: Lucas, R.E. (Ed.), Studies in Business Cycle Theory. 
Oxford, pp. 66-89. 
Mayer, T., 1996. The Dark Side of Economic Modeling. In: Medema/Samuels (Eds.) (1996), 
Foundations of Research in Economics: How Do Economists Do Economics? 
Aldershot/Hunts, pp. 191- 203.   33
McCallum, Bennett, T., 1999.  Recent Developments in Monetary Policy Analysis: The Roles 
of Theories and Evidence. In: Journal of Economic Methodology 6:2, 171-198. 
Mishkin, F.S., 1995. The Rational Expectations Revolution: A Review Article of: Preston J. 
Miller, Ed: The Rational Expectations Revolution, Readings from the front Line. NBER 
Working Papers Series, No. 5043, Cambridge/Massachusetts. 
Morishima, M., 1991. General Equilibrium Theory in the Twenty-First Century. In: The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 101, 69-74. 
Muchlinski, E., 2003.  Knowledge, Knowledge Sharing and Convention in Keynes' Thinking. 
In: Helmstädter, Ernst (Ed.), The Economics of Knowledge Sharing. Edward Elgar, pp. 115-
129. 
Muchlinski, E., 2003a.  Épistémologie et probabilité chez Keynes in: L´ACTUALITÉ 
ÉCONOMIQUE. REVUE D´ANALYSE ÉCONOMIQUE, Vol. 79- N
os 1-2, janvier-décembre 
2003, HEC Montréal, Sociéte Canadienne de Science Économique, pp. 57-70. 
Muchlinski, E., 2003b. Against Rigid Rules – Keynes’s economic theory. 
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin 
Nr. 2003/2, ISBN-3-935058-50-0. 
Muchlinski, E., 1998.  The Philosophy of John Maynard Keynes - A Reconsideration. In: 
Cahiers D’Économie Politique. Histoire de la Pensée et Théories. Vol. 30-31, L’Harmattan, 
Paris/Montreal, pp. 227-253. 
Muchlinski, E., 1996.  Keynes als Philosoph. Duncker and Humblot, Berlin. 
Phelps, M. G., 1979.  Laments, Ancient, and Modern: Keynes on Mathematical and 
Econometric Methodology. In: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Bd. 2, 482-493. 
Rima, I., 1988. Keynes and Econometric Method. In: Hamouda, O.F./Smithin, J.N., Eds.,   
Keynes and Public Policy After Fifty Years. Vol. I (Economics and Policy), Vol. II (Theories 
and Method), Cambridge/UK, pp. 12-22.   34
Sargent, T. J./Wallace, N., 1975.  Rational Expectations - The Optimal Instrument and the 
Optimal Money Supply Rule. In: Journal of Political Economy, 83 (2), 241-54. 
Sargent, T. J., 1996.  Expectations and the Nonneutrality of Lucas. In: Journal of Monetary 
Economics 37,  535-548. 
Skidelsky, R., 1983. John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed 1883-1920. Two Volumes. 
London. 
Staiger, D./Stock, J.H./Watson, M.W., 1997. The Nairu, Unemployment and Monetary 
Policy. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 1997,  33-49. 
Stiglitz, J., 1997.  Reflections on the Natural Rate Hypothesis. In: Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 1997, 3-10. 
Summers, L.H., 1991.  The Scientific Illusion in Empirical Macroeconomics. In: 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 93, 129-148. 
Tinbergen, J., 1938.  Letter to Keynes. In: Collected Writings,  Vol. XIV, p. 293. 
Tinbergen, J., 1940.  The Economic Journal 1940, No. 50, pp. 141-154. 
Tinbergen, J., 1952.  On the Theory of Economic Policy. Amsterdam. 
Tinbergen, J., 1956.  Economic Policy: Principles and Design. Amsterdam. 
Tobin, J., 1993. On the Theory of Macroeconomic Policy. In: Knoester, A./Wellink, 
A.H.E.M. (Eds.), Tinbergen Lectures on Economic Policy. Amsterdam/London/New 
York/Tokyo, pp. 89-102. 
Vickers, J., 1998.  Inflation Targeting in Practice: The UK Experience. Bank of England 
Quartely Bulletin, November, 368-375. 